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Abstract
The unconventional monetary policy actions of the Federal Reserve during the recent
Global Financial Crisis often involve implicit subsidies to banks. This paper o¤ers a theory
of the non-neutrality of money associated with capital injection into banks via nominal
transfers, in an environment where banking frictions are present in the sense that there
exists an agency problem between banks and their private-sector creditors. The analysis is
conducted within a general equilibrium setting with two-sided nancial contracting. We rst
show that even with perfect nominal exibility, the recapitalization policy has real e¤ects on
the economy. We then introduce banking riskiness shocks and study optimal policy responses
to such shocks.
JEL Classication: E44, E52, D82, D86.
Keywords: Bankruptcy of banks; banking riskiness shocks; two-sided debt contract;
unconventional monetary policy; nancial crisis.
I wish to thank an anonymous referee whose comments have led to great improvement of the paper. Par-
ticipants at the Econometric Society World Congress 2010, the 16th Australasian Macroeconomics Workshop
2011, the Conference The Role of Finance in Stabilizing the Past, Present, and Future Real Economyheld in
DIW Berlin, and Monash University Department of Economics Workshop also provided helpful comments. I am
especially indebted to Larry Christiano and Yi Jin for their encouragement. All errors are mine.
yDepartment of Economics, Monash University, Cauleld East, VIC 3145, Australia. Phone: +61-3-99034045,
Fax: +61-3-99031128, Email: zhixiong.zeng@monash.edu.
1 Introduction
The Federal Reserve took a variety of unconventional policy actions to cope with the recent
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). As traditional interest rate policy that adjusts the federal funds
rate was perceived to be ine¤ective (Cecchetti, 2009), the Fed adopted various measures of the
so-called unconventional monetary policy.1 In addition to injecting liquidity into the nancial
system (Brunnermeier, 2009), some of the Feds policy measures also had the avor of providing
capital subsidy to banks, a point forcefully made by Cecchetti (2009). This is certainly true
when the Fed directly purchased assets previously held by banks, such as mortgage backed
securities, at above market prices. It can also be argued that lending by the Fed during the
crisis almost always involved subsidies. By accepting collaterals at prices that were almost surely
above their actual market prices (Tett, 2008) and charging lower interest rates (relative to the
federal funds rate) when banks were actually perceived by the market to be exposed to greater
risks, Fed lending in e¤ect recapitalized the borrowing banks through nominal transfers: On
one hand, reserves and monetary base were created. On the other hand, banks were getting
more funds than they could borrow from the market for the same interest rates and the same
collateral assets. During the early phase of the crisis, the Fed attempted to stimulate discount
borrowing, which is collateralized, by reducing substantially the premium charged on primary
discount lending over the federal funds rate target and raising the term of lending from overnight
to as long as three months. In addition, to remove the stigma attached to discount borrowing2,
the Fed created the Term Auction Facility (TAF) in December 2007 and enlarged it later on
in order to better provide funds to banks that need them most. The rules of the TAF allowed
1See Reis (2009) and Goodfriend (2011) for reviews. Recent models of unconventional monetary policy include
Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Cúrdia and Woodford (2011), among others.
2Traditionally, banks that borrowed from the discount window might be seen by other banks and institutions
as having nancial stress.
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banks to pledge collaterals that might otherwise have little market value. With few exceptions,
the interest rates paid on TAF loans were near or below the expected primary discount lending
rate.3
To be sure, the unconventional monetary policy is multi-faceted. This paper focuses on one
particular aspect of the policy, namely, implicit capital subsidy to banks nanced by money
creation. In light of the celebrated Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958),
such recapitalization policy would be ine¤ective in stimulating employment and output in a
world where banks can frictionlessly raise funds to nance the loans they make, as the capital
structure of banks would be irrelevant for their lending activities and the real market value of
their loan portfolios. In that kind of world the classical dichotomy holds and recapitalization
of banks by the monetary authority is neutral, despite that it does involve a real transfer
that enlarges banksnet worth relative to debt (because other sectors of the economy are not
getting the same nominal transfer). However, as will be demonstrated in this paper, once an
agency problem is introduced to the relationship between banks and their private-sector creditors
(henceforth depositorsfor ease of exposition)4, the Modigliani-Miller theorem fails for banks,
the classical dichotomy breaks down, and money is no longer neutral when central bank policy
takes the form of injecting money to the banking system to increase bank capital. In particular,
a bank recapitalization e¤ort by the monetary authority triggers a redistribution of wealth in
favor of the banks, lowers their debt-equity ratio and costs of external nance, hence stimulates
bank lending and raises employment and output. Importantly, this non-neutrality result obtains
3For details, see Cecchetti (2009). The quantity of TAF lending turned out to be large. In January 2009 they
constituted more than one fth of the Feds total assets. Similar programs established by the Fed include the
Term Securities Lending Facility, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility, etc.
4 It should be claried here that we use the term deposits in the broadest sense, referring to all liabilities of
banks that are held by the private sector. Meanwhile, we lump all the private-sector creditors of banks into a
single category of agents called depositors.We also lump all types of banks into a single banking sector.
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even without any kind of nominal rigidities.5 The potency of the bank recapitalization policy
allows it to be used as a stabilization tool when the economy is subject to shocks to the riskiness
of banking.6
Needless to say, understanding the mechanism through which policy works is crucial for as-
sessing the e¤ectiveness of central bank reactions to the crisis. Impotent policy is clearly not
interesting. The main thrust of the paper is that to make sense of the bank recapitalization
policy, one has to take seriously frictions on the liability side of the bank balance sheet, i.e.,
frictions in the relationship between banks and depositors. The reason is that it is precisely fric-
tions on this side, rather than frictions on the asset side, that are responsible for the real e¤ects
of bank recapitalization policy. As is already well known, on the asset side of the bank balance
sheet there might exist informational asymmetry regarding the ability of (nonnancial) rms to
repay their loans, giving rise to an agency problem between banks and rms as emphasized in
the seminal work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and a large literature that follows.7 Frictions
of this kind are the literatures main focus thus far. We shall refer to them as credit frictions,
for the sake of distinguishing it from the informational asymmetry and agency problem on the
liability side of the bank balance sheet, which we shall call banking frictions.To introduce
the latter kind of frictions we apply the costly-state-verication (CSV) framework of Townsend
(1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Williamson (1986) to the bank-depositor relationship. In
our model banks face idiosyncratic risks and depositors have to expend monitoring costs in order
to verify bankscapacities to repay. We emphasize that bank recapitalization by the monetary
authority is neutral when banking frictions are absent, even if the conventionally studied credit
5Diamond and Rajan (2006) analyze how changes in money supply a¤ect real activities through a liquidity
version of the bank lending channel, without relying on sticky prices, reserve requirements, or deposit insurance.
6The extent of banking riskiness is represented by a dispersion parameter in the distribution of idiosyncratic
bank risks and is assumed to stochastic in the paper.
7Examples include Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Fisher (1999), and
Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003, 2009), etc.
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frictions are present. This implies that what credit frictions do is at best to amplify and propa-
gate the policys real e¤ects which are brought forth solely by the existence of banking frictions.
We are thus compelled to give special attention to the roles banking frictions play. Modeling
banking frictions and studying their implications for the e¤ects of bank recapitalization policy
is precisely the goal of this paper.
In a model that allows for perfect nominal exibility, some other sort of frictions must be
employed to generate the non-neutrality of money. In Lucas(1972) misperceptions theory it
is the imperfect information about the overall price level that temporarily misleads suppliers
and generates real e¤ects of money supply shocks. It seems that information on money supply
and other policy instruments is available to the public with little delay so there is no serious
signal extraction problem to solve. Hence the misperceptions story might not be particularly
relevant for studying the e¤ects of unconventional monetary policy. In contrast, this paper
assumes full information on all aggregate variables but uses a di¤erent kind of information
problem to generate the non-neutrality of money. The problem here concerns costly revelation
of banks information to depositors, which leads to the breakdown of the Modigliani-Miller
theorem and gives rise to a nontrivial role for bankscapital structure. The basic framework of
banking frictions this paper builds on is laid out in Zeng (2002). The current paper presents
a two-period model with risk averse depositors. An innite-horizon version with risk neutral
depositors is analyzed in Zeng (2010).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the economic environment,
the agents and their nancial relationships, as well as the production and information structure.
Section 3 analyzes two-sided nancial contracting with idiosyncratic bank risks. The general
equilibrium e¤ects of the bank recapitalization policy and the optimal stabilization policy are
studied in Section 4. The last section concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
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2 The Model
2.1 The Environment
There are four types of agents in the economy saver/depositors, bankers, entrepreneurs, and
workers. Entrepreneurs own the production technologies and operate the rms. They need to
hire labor from the workers but are short of funds in paying the wage bills if they do not borrow
from the banks in advance. Banks, which are run by the bankers, in turn secure funds from the
saver/depositors to nance their lending activities. The nancial contracting problem is thus
two-sided: Banks sign loan contracts with the rms and deposit contracts with the depositors.
To simplify the analysis, we a consider a two-period setup.8 Production uses capital and
labor and takes place only in period 1. We assume that each rm owns the same xed amount of
physical capital Kf , and that each bank owns the same xed amount Kb. There is a competitive
rental market with rental rate Rk. And the rental income of capital constitutes the rms and
banksinternal funds.9 Since the rmsinternal funds are generated entirely from the current
rental value of the capital stock they own, in a market clearing equilibrium they must borrow
additional funds to nance their purchase of labor inputs supplied by the workers plus rental
services provided by the stock of physical capital owned by the banks. The paper thus emphasizes
working capital nancing as in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). Our model di¤ers from theirs
in that nancial frictions are inicted on the rmspurchases of factor inputs, giving rise to a
nancially distorted labor market. In essence, what we are proposing is a nance-augmented
neoclassical theory of production and employment.
8An innite-horizon version of the model is presented in Zeng (2010), who assumes perfect insurance among
the depositors so that they are e¤ectively risk-neutral with respect to bank risks. This assumption allows for the
usage of a representative-household setup when characterizing the saving behavior. In the present paper there is
no perfect insurance among the depositors. Agents receiving di¤erent shocks will end up with di¤erent levels of
wealth. We choose to work with the two-period, rather than innite-horizon, setup in order to avoid the di¢ culty
of keeping track of the distribution of money balances across the risk-averse depositors, which would complicate
the analysis without adding much more insight.
9As capital is productive only in period 1, its price is zero in period 2 and equals the rental rate in period 1.
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At the beginning of period 1, the agents are endowed with initial money balances of certain
amounts. Since the government provides nominal transfers (money injections) before nancial
contracts are negotiated in the period, these initial balances are irrelevant. What matters is the
amount of money balances held by each type of agents that results after the transfers are made.
Let the after-transfer money balance be Md for each depositor, M b for each bank, and Mw for
each worker (for simplicity assume that the rms do not receive any money balance). The total
amount of after-transfer money balance is then M Md +M b +Mw. There is a risk-free bond
of zero supply. The interest rate on this bond, i.e., the risk-free nominal interest rate, is pegged
by the government at R > 1.10
The funds circulate in the following way. First, the sum of Md and M b is channelled by the
banks and goes to the rms to purchase labor L in the competitive labor market at nominal
wage rate W . In fact, the loan market clears when11
WL = M b +Md: (1)
The sum then becomes labor income at the hands of the workers. The workers use WL plus
their after-transfer money balance Mw to purchase consumption goods C1 at price level P1.
That is, P1C1 = WL+Mw. Substituting (1) into this budget equation, we obtain the quantity
equation:
P1C1 = M: (2)
The sum of money M is received by the rms as revenues. It is then divided among the rms,
10The ability of the government to x R in addition to the money balances is derived from the assumption
that the savers consume in the second period only. Having R pegged allows us to abstract away from the e¤ect
of money injections on the extent of monetary distortions and to concentrate on nancial distortions. See Zeng
(2010) for an alternative setup that endogenizes the risk-free nominal interest rate and introduces a potential
tradeo¤ between monetary and nancial distortions.
11The loan market clearing condition takes the form (1) because the rmsrental payment on capital is covered
by the rental value of the stock of capital owned by the rms and banks. It remains that their wage bills are
to be ultimately nanced by the after-transfer money balances of the banks and depositors. To write the loan
market clearing condition in full, we have RkK+WL = RkKf +
 
RkKb +Mb

+Md. This simplies to (1) since
K = Kf +Kb.
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banks, and depositors according to the nancial contracts and carried over by these agents to
period 2 to purchase consumption goods. We assume that there are output endowments in
period 2 given by C2 > 0. The period-2 price level is thus P2 = M=C2. At the end of period 2,
all of the money stock M retires. Figure 1 illustrates the ow of funds in the model.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
The workers work and consume only in period 1. They have constant marginal rate of substi-
tution between leisure and consumption, given by  > 0. Hence the real wage rate W=P1 always
equals . We treat the workers as being risk neutral since they do not face any idiosyncratic
uncertainty at all: They always receive the full payment of wages since the rms must deliver
this payment before labor can be provided. In contrast, the depositors, bankers, and entre-
preneurs, who for simplicity only consume in period 2, all face idiosyncratic uncertainty. We
assume that the bankers and entrepreneurs are risk neutral, but the depositors are risk averse,
with logarithmic utility function. In the nancial relationships among these three parties, the
banks face risks of default by the rms that borrow from them, and the depositors face risks of
default by the banks where they made deposits.
The focus of our analysis is on how the distribution of purchasing powers in period 1 (the
relative fractions ofMd andM b inM) a¤ects the terms of nancial contracts negotiated, which in
turn a¤ect the quantity of labor input and output produced in that period. Note that the terms of
nancial contracts also determine the division of rm revenuesM among the contracting parties
and hence the distribution of period-2 purchasing powers (claims on consumption goods) among
the depositors, bankers, and entrepreneurs. Put in a di¤erent way, the division of surplus (in the
form of future consumption) as dictated by the nancial contracts has non-trivial implications
for current employment and production. Before analyzing the nancial contracting problem a
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detailed description of the production and information structure is necessary.
2.2 The Production and Information Structure
Production in period 1 takes place in an environment with a unit-mass continuum of regions
indexed by i, i 2 [0; 1]. In region i there is one bank, called bank i, and a unit-mass continuum
of rms indexed by ij, j 2 [0; 1]. Each rm resides in a distinct location and is owned by
an entrepreneur, who operates a stochastic production technology that transforms labor and
capital services into a homogeneous nal output. The technology of rm ij is represented by
the production function
yij = i!ijF (kij ; lij) ; (3)
where yij ; kij ; and lij denote nal output, capital input, and labor input, respectively, of rm
ij. The function F () is linearly homogeneous, increasing and concave in its two arguments,
and satises the usual Inada conditions. All sources of idiosyncratic risks are captured in the
productivity factor, with i being the random productivity specic to region i, and !ij the
random productivity specic to location ij. We assume that i is identical and independently
distributed across regions, with c.d.f. r () and p.d.f. r (), and that !ij is identical and
independently distributed across locations, with c.d.f. l () and p.d.f. l (). Both i and
!ij have non-negative support and unit mean. Furthermore, i and !j , i;  ; j 2 [0; 1] are
uncorrelated with each other. The distributions are known by all agents in the economy. Once
the rms acquire factor inputs, production takes place, and the region and location specic
productivities realize. The nal output is sold in a competitive goods market.
We use the CSV approach of Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Williamson
(1986) to model nancial frictions and nancial contracting. It is assumed that there is an
ex post informational asymmetry regarding borrowersrevenues. In particular, only borrowers
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themselves can costlessly observe their realized revenues, while lenders have to expend a veri-
cation cost in order to observe the same object. In our environment only rm ij can observe
at no cost sfij  i!ij , and only bank i can observe i costlessly. For a bank to observe sfij
(or !ij) and for a depositor to observe i, verication costs have to be incurred. Note that
by lending to a continuum of rms in a particular region each bank e¤ectively diversies away
all the rm/location specic risks. But the region specic risk is not diversiable, giving rise
to the possibility that a bank becomes insolvent when an adverse regional shock occurs. Our
model thus features potential bankruptcy of banks in addition to bankruptcy of nonnancial
rms. Note that even if the working capital loans are perfectly safe for the banks (no default
by the rms), the depositors still regard their claims on the banks as being risky due to the
informational asymmetry on the idiosyncratic bank/region productivities.
The concept of regions should not be interpreted literally as reecting geographic areas,
albeit this is certainly one of the many possible interpretations. Rather, it is a device designed
to generate risks idiosyncratic to individual banks. If banks are subject to risks that cannot be
fully diversied, then the kind of agency problem between banks and rms applies equally well
to the relationship between banks and depositors. In that case there are needs to monitor the
monitor, in the terminology of Krasa and Villamil (1992a). Bank-level risks might stem from
geographic connement of an individual banks operation to specic areas, as in the U.S. when
out-of-state branching was restricted (see Williamson, 1989). They might also be due to the
concentration of a banks lending activities in specic industries. Savings and loan associations
in the U.S., which historically concentrated on mortgage loans, was a good example. It should be
noted that even without branching restrictions or regulations on bankslending and investment
activities, an individual bank might optimally choose to limit its scale and/or scope of operation
so that the risks associated with its lending activities are not fully diversied. An example
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appears in Krasa and Villamil (1992b), who consider the trade-o¤ involved in increasing the size
of a banks portfolio (i.e., lending to additional borrowers). In their model balancing the gains
from decreased default risk with the losses from increased monitoring costs leads to an optimal
scale for banks. Another example is Cerasi and Daltung (2000), who introduce considerations
on the internal organization of banks that render scale economies in the banking sector rapidly
exhausted.12 In this paper we follow Krasa and Villamil (1992a) and Zeng (2007) to assume that
an individual bank cannot contract with a su¢ cient variety of borrowers so that the credit risks
are not perfectly diversiable. The model thus di¤ers from Diamond (1984) and Williamson
(1986), where the size of the nancial intermediary grows without bound so that the cost of
delegation vanishes in the limit.
3 Financial Contracting with Banking Risks
3.1 The Two-Sided Debt Contract
The three groups of players in the nancial market rms, banks, and depositors are connected
via a two-sided contract structure. Both sides of the contract, one between the rms and banks
and the other between the banks and depositors t into a generic framework we now describe.
Here attention is restricted to deterministic monitoring.13 Since the borrowers (rms and banks)
are assumed to be risk neutral, the optimal contract between a generic borrower and a generic
lender takes the form of a standard debt contract, in Gale and Hellwig (1985)s term. Note that
with risk averse depositors standard debt contracts are optimal not only because they minimize
12Specically, loan o¢ cers, who are the ones actually making loans, have to be monitored by the banker.
13The assumption of deterministic monitoring is actually less restrictive than it appears. Krasa and Villamil
(2000) articulates a costly enforcement model that justies deterministic monitoring when commitment is limited
and enforcement is costly and imperfect. See also Mookherjee and Png (1989) and Boyd and Smith (1994) on
deterministic versus stochastic monitoring. Krasa and Villamil (1994) analyze optimal multilateral contracts when
verication technology is either deterministic or stochastic. Strategic interaction between multiple nanciers is
considered by Khalil, Martimort, and Parigi (2007).
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the need for monitoring, but also because they provide optimal risk sharing.14
Suppose that the borrowers revenue is given by V s, where V is a component freely observable
to both the borrower and the lender, and s  0 is a unit-mean risky component that is subject
to informational asymmetry, whereby the borrower can costlessly observe s while the lender has
to expend a verication cost in order to do so. The verication cost is assumed to be  times
the borrowers revenue, with  2 (0; 1). The c.d.f. of s, given by  (), is common knowledge.
The contract species a set of realizations of s for which monitoring occurs, together with a
payment schedule. An incentive compatible contract must specify a xed payment for s in
the non-monitoring set, otherwise the borrower will always report the value of s for which the
payment is lowest among non-monitoring states. A standard debt contract with monitoring
threshold s is an incentive compatible contract with the following features: (i) the monitoring
set is fsjs < sg, (ii) the xed payment is V s for s 2 fsjs  sg, and (iii) the payment is V s
for s 2 fsjs < sg. The standard debt contract is particularly interesting because it resembles
many nancial contracts in the real world. It features xed payment for non-default states and
state-contingent payment when default occurs. Requiring the borrower to repay as much as
possible in default states allows the xed payment for non-default states to be minimized, thus
minimizing the probability of verication and thus the expected monitoring cost.
Under the standard debt contract, the borrower and the lender each obtains a share of the
expected revenue V . The borrower receives V   (s; ) where
  (s; ) 
Z 1
s
(s  s) d (s) , (4)
reecting the fact that with s above s; the borrower gives out the xed payment V s and keeps
the remaining, while with s below s, all revenues are conscated by the lender. The lender
14Problems only arise if the borrowers are more risk averse, because it is then optimal for the lenders to reduce
the borrowersexposure to risk. See, for example, Hellwig (2000).
11
receives V	 (s; ) where
	 (s; )  s [1   (s)] + (1  )
Z s
0
sd (s) . (5)
When s is larger than or equal to s, which occurs with probability 1  (s), the lender recoups
the xed proportion s of the expected revenue V . If s falls below s, the lender takes all of the
realized revenue while expending a verication cost which equals a fraction  of the revenue.15
The following assumption on the distribution of s is imposed.
Assumption 1. (a) The p.d.f  () is positive, bounded, and continuously di¤erentiable on
(0;1), and (b) s (s) = [1   (s)] is an increasing function of s.16
It can be shown that for s > 0,
 0 (s; ) =   [1   (s)] < 0;
	0 (s; ) = 1   (s)  s (s) > 0; if s < s^,
and
 0 (s; ) + 	0 (s; ) =  s (s) < 0;
where the primes denote derivatives with respect to s and s^ satises 1    (s^)   s^ (s^) = 0.
We rule out the possibility of credit rationing by requiring V	 (s^; ) to be no less than the
opportunity cost of funds for the lender (see Williamson, 1986). Thus the domain of s we are
interested in is [0; s^) and 	0 (s; ) > 0 on this interval.17 It is interesting to note that changes
in the monitoring threshold (and hence the default probability) generate redistributions of the
15Note that   (s; )+	 (s; ) = 1  R s
0
sd (s) < 1, indicating that there is a direct deadweight loss 
R s
0
sd (s)
due to costly monitoring.
16The assumption that s (s) = [1   (s)] is increasing in s is weaker than the increasing hazard assumption
commonly made in the incentive contract literature, which requires  (s) = [1   (s)] to be monotonically increas-
ing in s. Yet the latter property is already satised by a fairly large class of distributions.
17 If the lender has logarithmic utility then the relevant s^ is the one that maximizes the function ~	 dened in
(14) below.
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expected revenue between the borrower and the lender. An increase in s reduces the share  
received by the borrower, while raising the share 	 received by the lender. The total e¤ect on the
returns to the two parties, however, is negative since the marginal increase in the lenders share
is less than the marginal increase in the borrowers share, reecting the additional monitoring
cost born by the lender at the margin.
We now apply this generic debt contract framework to the bank-rm relationship. The rms
revenue can be written as V f!, where V f  PF (k; l)  is freely observable to the bank, and
! is the risk that can be observed by the bank only with a cost.18 The bank-rm contract
species a monitoring threshold, denoted by !, for the rm/location specic productivity !.
Conditional on the region specic productivity , the expected return to the rm is then given
by PF (k; l)  f
 
!; l

and the revenue of the bank from lending to the rms in its region is
PF (k; l) 	b
 
!; l

, where  f
 
!; l

and 	b
 
!; l

result from substituting
 
!; l

for (s; )
in (4) and (5).19
The contracting problem between the bank and its depositors species a monitoring threshold
for the bank risk . To t this into the generic setup, write the banks revenue as V b, where
V b  PF (k; l) 	b  !; l. Here ! the monitoring threshold in the bank-rm contract is freely
observable to both the bank and the depositors. Let  represent the monitoring threshold for
 in the bank-depositor contract. Then the expected return to the bank from the contract is
V b b
 
; r

and the expected return to the depositors is V b	d
 
; r

, where  b
 
; r

and
	d
 
; r

obtain from substituting
 
; r

for (s; ) in (4) and (5). Note, however, that with
risk aversion, what the depositors care is their expected utility, which obviously di¤ers from the
expected nancial return o¤ered by the contract. Details are provided in the next subsection.
18From the banks perspective, monitoring sf  ! is equivalent to monitoring ! given its information in .
19By the law of large numbers, the revenue of the bank from lending to all of the rms in its region is the same
as the expected revenue from lending to one rm, the expectation taken over the distribution of ! and conditional
on .
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3.2 Optimal Competitive Contract
To motivate competitive banking assume that in principle a bank is allowed to operate beyond
its region. But that entails a xed cost. If this cost goes to zero, then the limit case is perfect
competition for the banking industry, where each bank o¤ers contracts that maximize the ex-
pected return to the rms in its region such that the bank itself at least earns the riskless return
on its own funds. We focus on this limit situation and state formally the optimal competitive
contract as solving the problem below. To simplify notations, the dependence of the   and 	
functions on l and r are omitted.
Problem 1.
max
k;l;Nd;!;
P1
P2
F (k; l)  f (!)
subject to
P1
P2
F (k; l) 	b (!)  b
 

  R
P2
N b; (6)

1  r  U  P1
P2
F (k; l) 	b (!)  +
R
 
Md  Nd
P2
!
(7)
+
Z 
0
U
 
P1
P2
F (k; l) 	b (!)  (1  ) + R
 
Md  Nd
P2
!
dr ()
 U

RMd
P2

Rkk +Wl  Nf +N b +Nd, (8)
where U () is logarithmic and 0  Nd  Md. Here P1F (k; l)  f (!) is the expected return to
the rm, unconditional on , from the contract in period 1. Dividing this by the period-2 price
level P2 yields the entrepreneurs expected consumption and hence expected utility. Inequality
(6) is the individual rationality (IR) constraint for the bank, which says that the bank must
obtain at least what it can earn by investing all of its capital (in the nancial sense) in riskless
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securities. The amount of the banks nancial capital equals the rental value of the physical
capital stock it owns plus its after-transfer money balance, M b. That is, N b  RkKb +M b.
Inequality (7), the IR constraint for the depositors, needs some explanation. A depositor
may choose to allocate her after-transfer money balance Md between bank deposits Nd and
investment
 
Md  Nd in the risk-free security, though in equilibrium Md = Nd because of the
zero supply of the risk-free bond. No matter what happens to bank solvency, the depositor gets
back R
 
Md  Nd from the risk-free investment. When   , which occurs with probability
1 r  , the depositor receives xed payment P1F (k; l) 	b (!)  from the deposit contract and
utility level U
 
P1F (k; l) 	
b (!) =P2 +R
 
Md  Nd =P2 from period-2 consumption. When
 < , the depositor receives P1F (k; l) 	b (!)  (1  ), net of monitoring costs, from the deposit
contract and utility level U
 
P1F (k; l) 	
b (!)  (1  ) =P2 +R
 
Md  Nd =P2. The expected
utility from the portfolio
 
Nd;Md  Nd must be no less than putting all ofMd into the risk-free
bond, which yields expected utility U
 
RMd=P2

. Note that implicit in (7) is the assumption
that each depositor contracts with only one bank and that there is no risk sharing among the
depositors.20
Finally, inequality (8) is the ow-of-funds constraint for the rms. The total bill for the
rms factor inputs is Rkk + Wl, which has to be covered by the internal funds of the rms
themselves, Nf  RkKf , and bank loans that equal the sum of bank capital N b and deposits
Nd. In Problem 1 Nf and N b are taken as given.
Dene the debt-equity ratiosfor the bank and rms, denoted by b and f respectively, as
b  N
d
N b
, f  N
b +Nd
Nf
.
As shown in the Appendix, with U () taking the log-form, the solution to Problem 1 satises
20Zeng (2007) endogenizes asset indivisibility by explicitly modeling nancial transaction costs that prevent the
depositors from perfectly diversifying their portfolios. Kilenthong (2011) considers imperfect risk sharing with
limited collateral.
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the conditions listed below, where we impose the equilibrium conditionMd Nd = 0 to simplify
notations, without neglecting the necessity to take derivatives via the term R
 
Md  Nd =P2.
Fk (k; l) = q
 
!; 

R
Rk
P1
; (9)
Fl (k; l) = q
 
!; 

R
W
P1
; (10)
~	d
 

  log  b   = log b ; (11)
q
 
!; 

	b (!)  b
 


=
1
1 + b
f
1 + f
; (12)
where
q
 
!; 
    f 0 (!)
 f (!) 	b0 (!)   f 0 (!) 	b (!)
  b0    
 b
 


~	d0
 

   b0   ; (13)
~	d
 

  1  r   log  + Z 
0
log [ (1  )]r () d; (14)

 

  1  r   1 +
Z 
0
1
 (1  )
r () d: (15)
Equations (9) and (10) are the rst-order conditions for factor demand, where the presence
of the term q creates wedges between the marginal products of factor inputs and their real
prices. We shall call q the nancial friction indicator, as it reects the distortions caused by the
agency problems in the two-sided nancial contracting. If either ! > 0 or  > 0 (or both) then
q
 
!; 

is strictly greater than one. Here ! > 0 indicates a positive default rate by the rms
and reects the agency costs in the bank-rm relationship. This is what the existing literature
on credit market imperfections has typically focused on. On the other hand,  > 0 corresponds
to a positive rate of default by the banks and reects the agency costs in the bank-depositor
relationship. The variable q
 
!; 

measures the overall distortions caused by the conventionally
studied credit frictions and the sort of banking frictions we introduce.21 Note that q is an
increasing function of ! and , with lim!;!0 q = 1.
21Another type of distortions is present with R > 1, which creates additional wedges between the marginal
products and real prices of factor inputs. This type of distortions arise from the requirement that factor market
transactions must use cash and can thus be named monetary frictions. The assumption that R is pegged by
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Equations (11) and (12) reect the fact that the optimal competitive contract entails binding
IR constraints for both the bank and the depositors. Essentially, the terms of contract dictate
a division of expected revenues between borrowers and lenders. Since ~	d
 

   log  b   is
increasing in , equation (11) indicates that the banks default probability increases along with
 when it has a larger debt-equity ratio b. The increase in  implies a larger share of expected
revenues received by the depositors, relative to the share received by the bank, in the bank-
depositor contract. Equation (12) indicates that given b and , the rmsdefault probability
increases along with ! when their debt-equity ratio f increases. The increase in ! implies a
larger share of expected revenues that goes to the rms in the bank-rm contract.
4 General Equilibrium and the E¤ects of Bank Recapitalization
In this section we characterize the competitive equilibrium of the model economy and analyze
how the bank recapitalization policy, taking the form of central bank money injection into the
banking system, a¤ects the real economy. The optimal policy responses to shocks to the riskiness
of banking will also be considered.
4.1 The Non-Neutrality of Money
To make the analysis tractable we further assume that the production function F () takes the
standard Cobb-Douglas form, i.e., F (K;L) = KL1 ,  2 (0; 1). This immediately implies,
via (9) and (10), that (1  )RkK = WL. Using this relationship, together with Nd = Md,
N b = RkKb +M b, the equality version of the ow-of-funds constraint (8), and WL = M  Mw,
the government at a xed value implies that the extent of such frictions is una¤ected by the bank recapitaliza-
tion policy, which allows us to focus on the e¤ect of the policy on the extent of nancial frictions. Arseneau
(forthcoming) considers monetary distortions in a new Keynesian open economy setup.
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we have
b =
(1  ) zd
Kb=K + (1  ) zb ,
1
1 + b
f
1 + f
= 
Kb
K
+ (1  ) zb; (16)
where
zb  M
b
M b +Md
and zd  M
d
M b +Md
are the fractions of (M  Mw) possessed by the banks and depositors, respectively, with zb+zd =
1. The pair
 
zb; zd

represents the distribution of after-transfer money balances between the
banks and depositors.
In light of (16), equations (11) and (12) become
~	d
 

  log  b   = log (1  ) zd
Kb=K + (1  ) zb

; (17)
q
 
!; 

	b (!)  b
 


= 
Kb
K
+ (1  ) zb: (18)
Thus
 
zb; zd

determines the bank default threshold  via (17) and in addition the rm default
threshold ! via (18). Given , ! (hence q), the real wage rate , and the pegged risk-free interest
rate R, the equilibrium employment L is determined by the following condition
Fl (K;L) = q
 
!; 

R: (19)
Furthermore, consumption in period 1 (by the workers) is given by
C1 = F (K;L)'
 
!; 

; (20)
where
'
 
!; 
   f (!) + 	b (!) h b  + 	d  i : (21)
Note that the net output factor '
 
!; 

< 1 for !;  > 0, indicating a direct deadweight loss
due to costly monitoring.
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If we think of monetary policy in our model as a specication of the vector
 
M;M b;Md;Mw

,
withM M b+Md+Mw, then the aspect of the policy that is relevant for allocations is simply
the distribution of (M  Mw) between M b and Md, as represented by the pair  zb; zd. Given 
zb; zd

, the only role of M is to determine the price level P1 = M=C1 through the quantity
equation (2). Since the total nominal wage bill is WL = P1L and must equal M b + Md in a
cleared loan market, the relationship
Mw = M   P1L (22)
must hold for the specication of policy to be internally consistent. Equation (22) can be seen
as a rule that the government uses to determine Mw for any given specication of
 
zb; zd;M

.
The policy vector can thus be equivalently represented by
 
zb; zd;M;Mw

, where Mw is given
by (22).22
In period 2, the price level equals P2 = M=C2 given the output endowment C2. The terms 
!; 

of period-1 nancial contract determine the division of C2 among the entrepreneurs,
bankers, and depositors, who only consume in period 2. The share of period-2 purchasing power
possessed by each type of agents equals the share of period-1 revenues that goes to that type
of agents as dictated by the contract. Hence total entrepreneurial consumption Cf2 , banker
consumption Cb2, and depositor consumption C
d
2 in period 2 are given by
Cf2 = C2
 f (!)
'
 
!; 
 , Cb2 = C2 	b (!)  b  '  !;  , Cd2 = C2 	b (!) 	d
 


'
 
!; 
 , (23)
respectively.23
Formally, a competitive equilibrium with banking frictions and two-sided nancial contract-
ing is dened as follows.
22The need to specify the rule (22) is a special feature of the current two-period setup, and is absent in the
innite-horizon model of Zeng (2010).
23Note that Cd2 is not only the total consumption of all depositors but also the expected consumption of an
individual depositor, which, of course, di¤ers from her expected utility due to risk aversion.
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Denition 1. A competitive equilibrium of the model economy is a policy
 
zb; zd;M;Mw

,
an allocation

L;C1; C
f
2 ; C
b
2; C
d
2

, a price system
 
P1;W;R
k; P2

, and terms of nancial contract 
!; 

such that
i. The period-1 contract terms and allocations, !; ; L; and C1, are determined by (17)-(20)
given the allocation-relevant policy
 
zb; zd

.
ii. Given M , the price levels P1 and P2 are determined by the quantity equations, i.e.,
P1 = M=C1 and P2 = M=C2. In addition W = P1 and Rk = WL= (1  ).
iii. the period-2 consumption allocation

Cf2 ; C
b
2; C
d
2

is given by (23).
iv. Mw is set in accordance with the rule (22) for any given specication of
 
zb; zd;M

.
For analytic purpose it will be especially convenient to look at the behavior of the model
economy around a situation where no default by either the banks or the rms occurs. We dene
such a situation as follows.
Denition 2. A zero-default equilibrium is the competitive equilibrium of the model econ-
omy obtained when the distributions for  and ! are degenerate.
Essentially, the asymmetric information problems disappear when  and ! are non-stochastic,
giving rise to zero default in equilibrium. Proof of the existence and uniqueness of the zero-
default equilibrium is trivial. Our analysis will focus on the neighborhood of this zero-default
equilibrium, where default occurs with small probabilities. According to Fisher (1999), the
historical average of bankruptcy rate is indeed quite small. This does not, however, mean that
the distortions caused by nancial frictions are negligible. The following proposition establishes
the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium as well as the real e¤ect of the bank recapitalization
policy.
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Proposition 1. A competitive equilibrium of the model economy with banking frictions
and two-sided nancial contracting exists and is unique in the neighborhood of zero-default for
any zb 2 (0; 1). In such a neighborhood an increase in zb raises equilibrium employment for any
zb 2 (0; 1).
Money is therefore non-neutral if and only if it is associated with a change in the distribution
of money balances between the banks and depositors. Taking the initial distribution of money
balances as given, any monetary transfer that leads to a change in
 
zb; zd

has real impact. The
general mechanism is as follows. An increase in zb (with a corresponding decrease in zb) lowers
the banksdebt-equity ratio b. This reduces the bank default threshold  via (17), consistent
with the depositorsreceiving a smaller share of revenues relative to the banks as dictated by the
bank-depositor contract. No matter what happens to the rm default threshold !, the nancial
friction indicator q must take a smaller value, as shown in the Appendix. The overall reduction
in the two-sided nancial frictions generates an increase in equilibrium employment according
to (19).
Consider the scenario when bank recapitalization, as an implicit part of the unconventional
monetary policy undertaken during the GFC, is implemented. Increases in zb are not produced
by directly taxing the depositors and transferring the proceeds to the banks. Rather, they
are produced by injecting newly created money to the banks. The resultant increases in the
aggregate amount of money balances are non-neutral as they are associated with increases in
zb. They stimulate employment by lowering bank leverage and the overall extent of nancial
distortions. This non-neutrality result depends crucially on the presence of banking frictions, i.e.,
frictions on the liability side of the bank balance sheet due to the informational asymmetry in
the bank-depositor relationship. Without such frictions, a neutrality result will obtain regardless
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of the value of
 
zb; zd

.24 These conclusions hold even with the presence of credit frictions, i.e.,
frictions on the asset side of the bank balance sheet due to the informational asymmetry in the
bank-rm relationship. It is therefore precisely the presence of banking frictions (and the fact
that banks are the institutions being recapitalized) that is responsible for the potency of the
recapitalization policy.
4.2 Banking Riskiness and Optimal Stabilization Policy
Our analysis thus far has treated the bank recapitalization policy as exogenous. In this section
we investigate how the policy can be used as a stabilization tool when there are shocks to
the riskiness of banking. To introduce the concept of banking riskiness, we assume that
the bank/region specic productivity  follows a unit-mean log-normal distribution on (0;1),
i.e., log ()  N   122; 2, where N stands for the normal distribution. The distribution is
completed by assigning a zero p.d.f. for  = 0. In our model, it is the costly verication of  that
gives rise to the bankruptcy of banks. The default rate of banks tends to zero as  tends to
zero from the right. Therefore the dispersion parameter  captures the extent of the riskiness
of banking. Here we allow  to be random. Specically, its realization is given by
 =  + "; (24)
where  > 0, representing the mean level of riskiness, is a positive constant, and " is a random
disturbance bounded away from  . We interpret " as the banking riskiness shock.25
In our view, shocks to banking riskiness are highly relevant in the light of the erratic behavior
of the risk spreads for banksexternal nance. The historical average of the spread between the
24To see this we can take away banking frictions from the model simply by assuming that the distribution
of the region specic productivity is degenerate. It is straightforward to show that in such an environment the
recapitalization policy is irrelevant for employment, output, real factor prices, and the rmsdefault rate.
25Our formulation of banking riskiness shocks parallels the formulation of entrepreneurial riskiness shocks in
Williamson (1987) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2003, 2009), who consider the costly state verication
problem between nancial intermediaries and nonnancial rms.
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3-month certicate of deposits (CD) rate and the 3-month T-bill rate is about 75 basis points
(per annum), based on a sample from 1973Q1 to 2009Q4. From 2001Q1 to 2007Q2, the spread
averages only 27 basis points. In contrast, its average in the second half of 2007 and the year
of 2008 rises to as high as 153 basis points, with a spike at 252 basis points in the fourth
quarter of 2008. In our model, there is a direct linkage between the level of banking riskiness
and the external nance premium faced by the banks. The gross interest rate at which the
banks borrow from the depositors is simply the non-default payment specied in the bank-
depositor contract divided by the amount of deposits, i.e., Rb = P1F (K;L) 	b (!) =Nd. Using
the binding IR constraint for the bank, equation (6), in Problem 1, we obtain the models bank
risk spread: Rb  R = R=  b   b  1	.26 Other things equal, an increase in  raises the
bank default rate and hence the bank risk spread. Fluctuations in banking riskiness thus give
rise to uctuations in the bank risk spread.
Let the bank recapitalization policy takes the form zb = +x, where  is a positive constant
and x is a random component bounded away from  . It is easy to see that when the policy is
specied as such and the banking riskiness  is as specied in (24), the existence and uniqueness
results for the competitive equilibrium, as established in Proposition 1, remain valid. The e¢ cacy
of the recapitalization policy applies as well. This enables the policy to serve as a stabilization
tool in the face of banking riskiness shocks. Taking the mean recapitalization  and the mean
riskiness  as given, we aim to analyze how the recapitalization policy can be used to bu¤er
the economy from the disturbance " to banking riskiness.27 We shall see that stabilization
considerations give rise to a particular kind of policy reaction function, or policy rule, which
dictates how x should respond to " in a systematic fashion.
26Similarly, the risk spread faced by the rms in the model is given by Rf   R =
R

!=
 
1 + b

	b (!)  b
 

  1	.
27Zeng (2010) discusses the optimal choice of .
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Suppose that the goal of the stabilization policy is to insulate employment L and net output
C1 from the banking riskiness shock. This would require both the nancial friction indicator q
and the net output factor ' to be completely stabilized, which is impossible since we would have
two targets and only one policy instrument. However, as shown in Zeng (2010), compared to q
the variable ' is only of second-order importance in the neighborhood of zero default. Hence,
an approximately optimal policy needs only seek to stabilize the nancial friction indicator
q. Our numerical result, to be presented momentarily, shows that targeting q alone actually
achieves near-complete stabilization of both q and ' and hence near-complete stabilization of
C1. Stabilization of q also turns out to insulate the total period-2 consumption of the depositors,
the risk-averse agents in the economy, from the banking riskiness shock almost perfectly. This is
because the consumption share of these agents, as in (23), depends on ! and  in a way similar
to the dependence of q on these default thresholds.28
Denote the value of q that would prevail without any shock by q. For the (approximately)
optimal stabilization policy, q serves as the target. In order to derive the optimal policy reaction
function, denote the mapping of ("; x) to q by q ("; x): The realization of " gives the value of ,
which, together with x, determines
 
!; 

and hence q through (17) and (18). Given ", targeting
q at q amounts to setting x at x, where x satises q ("; x) = q. To keep the value of q at
q, an increase in " calls for a larger value of x to o¤set the e¤ect of the increased banking
riskiness. Hence x varies positively with ", with x = 0 when " = 0. Such a reaction function
entails recapitalization e¤orts that counteract banking riskiness: there is more (less) nominal
capital transfer to the banks when banking becomes more (less) risky.
28There is an important distinction between individual depositor consumption and total depositor consumption,
the former subject to idiosyncratic bank risks (the  shocks), the latter immune to idiosyncratic risks but subject to
system risks (the  shocks) and hence the banking riskiness shock. The banking riskiness shock is an economywide
shock since all individual banks face the common level of riskiness. The e¤ect of this shock is o¤set by the
stabilization policy.
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To demonstrate numerically the optimal reaction function, we calibrate the model economy
as follows. Let a time period correspond to a quarter. We set R = 1:014, consistent with the
historical average of the 3-month T-bill rate.29 The weight of leisure relative to consumption
in worker utility, , is chosen to deliver L = 1=3 absent shocks and frictions. The elasticity
parameter in the production function, , is set to be 1=2, implying an asset-net worth ratio of
about 2 for the rms (see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999).30 Normalizing K = 1 and
Kb = 0, the value of  is set to be 0:076, which matches the historical average of an asset-net
worth ratio of 13:18 for U.S. commercial banks.31 The monitoring cost parameter, , is set to
be 0:36.32 Similar to the bank/region specic productivity, we assume that the rm/location
specic productivity ! follows a unit-mean log-normal distribution on (0;1), completed with
the assignment of a zero p.d.f. for ! = 0. For ! > 0, log (!)  N   122!; 2!. We assume that
! is xed, while  follows the specication in (24). The value of ! and the mean value of ,
i.e., , are chosen to match (1) a spread between the rmsborrowing rate and the risk-free
rate of 293 basis points per annum, and (2) a spread between the banksborrowing rate and the
risk-free rate of 75 basis points per annum.33
Figure 2 depicts the optimal recapitalization policy in relation to the level of banking risk-
iness. The middle and bottom panels show the e¤ects of the riskiness shock " on the nancial
friction indicator q and employment L. The dashed lines correspond to the case where there
29We do not pursue the possibility of reducing R to near the zero lower bound for the risk-free nominal interest
rate.
30 If the variable K in the production function were interpreted literally as physical capital, then 1=2 would
be too large a value for . Nevertheless, a broader interpretation may be adopted: the variable may be thought
to include bank and rm managershuman capital, e.g., managerial skills, as well.
31This calculation is based on Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United Statesof the Federal
Reserve. The sample period is 1973Q1-2009Q4.
32By comparing the value of a rm as a going concern with its liquidation value, Alderson and Betker (1995)
estimate that liquidation costs are equal to approximately 36 percent of rms assets.
33The empirical measures of the risk-free rate, the banksborrowing rate, and the rmsborrowing rate are
the 3-month T-bill rate, the 3-month CD rate, and the prime lending rate, respectively. The data are from the
Federal Reserve. The sample period is again 1973Q1-2009Q4.
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is no policy reaction to the shocks, i.e., x equals zero identically. The solid lines correspond
to the case where the policy reacts in the optimal fashion described above. As can be seen
from the no-reaction lines, the e¤ect of a positive (resp. negative) shock to banking riskiness
is to raise (resp. lower) q and reduce (resp. increase) L. The e¤ects are asymmetric in that
the e¤ects of positive shocks are stronger. This is because negative shocks drive the economy
toward the situation without banking frictions, which provides the limit for the strength of the
e¤ects. The nonlinearity is also evident from the larger marginal e¤ects of positive shocks (the
dashed lines are steeper to the right of " = 0).34 By reacting to the banking riskiness shocks
in the optimal fashion, the bank recapitalization policy stabilizes employment, as shown by the
solid lines. The optimal reaction function is plotted on the top panel, where x turns out be an
increasing, approximately linear function of ".35
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
5 Conclusions
This paper develops a general equilibrium framework with banking frictions and two-sided nan-
cial contracting. The framework is used to analyze the e¤ects of bank recapitalization, taking
the form of nominal capital transfers to the banking system. The design of optimal stabilization
policy, in relation to the riskiness of banking, is also investigated. The paper contributes to
understanding the transmission mechanisms of the unconventional monetary policy measures
adopted during the GFC, and to understanding how policy should be designed to mitigate the
adverse e¤ects of nancial shocks.
34Krasa, Sharma, and Villamil (2008) analyze agents incentives to default and show that the enforcement
parameters in their model can generate a sharply nonlinear e¤ect on rm nance.
35The approximate linearity obtains since the marginal employment e¤ect of x is also weaker when the marginal
employment e¤ect of " is weaker, i.e., when banking is less risky.
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Although our study has mainly concerned the e¤ects of bank recapitalization by the monetary
authority and the analysis has been carried out in a highly stylized model, the theoretical
framework can be extended to study a wide spectrum of issues related to policy and regulation,
as well as the monetary transmission mechanism, in perhaps more realistic ways. First, nominal
rigidities and richer dynamics, such as capital accumulation, can be introduced to allow for a
quantitative assessment of the e¤ects of policy. Second, deposit insurance can be incorporated
in order to study the e¤ects of raising the limit of deposit insurance, as was implemented in
the U.S. in 2008.36 Third, one can consider situations where some sort of capital adequacy
requirements bind. In those situations, bank recapitalization policy may work through relaxing
these constraints. Fourth, the model can be extended to allow changes in asset prices to a¤ect the
net worth of banks (and rms), as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano,
Motto, and Rostagno (2003, 2009). Finally, our analysis can be extended to include credit
rationing as a possible equilibrium outcome as in Williamson (1986) so that another dimension
in which policy exerts inuence on the economy can be explored.37 We conclude that thorough
analysis of frictions in the banking sector should be an integral part of future research on the
interaction of money, nance, and the macroeconomy.
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Appendix
Derivation of the Optimality Conditions for Problem 1.
We rst show that conditions (9)-(12) hold. In the derivation below we impose the fact that
Md   Nd = 0 in equilibrium to simplify notations, without neglecting the necessity to take
derivatives via the term R
 
Md  Nd =P2. Let b and d be the Lagrangian multipliers for (6)
and (7), respectively. With U () taking the log-form, the rst-order conditions with respect to
! and  are
0 =
h
 f 0 (!) + b	b0 (!)  b
 

i
+
d
P1
P2
F (k; l)
	b0 (!)
	b (!)
; (A.1)
0 = b	b (!)  b0
 


+
d
P1
P2
F (k; l)
~	d0
 


: (A.2)
Equations (A.1) and (A.2) imply
b =
  f 0 (!) ~	d0  
	b0 (!)
h
 b
 


~	d0
 

   b0  i ; (A3)
d =
P1
P2
F (k; l)
 f 0 (!) 	b (!)  b0
 


	b0 (!)
h
 b
 


~	d0
 

   b0  i : (A4)
The rst-order conditions with respect to k and l are given by (9) and (10), where
q 
d
P1
P2
F (k;l)
()
	b(!)
 f (!) + b	b (!)  b
 


+ 
d
P1
P2
F (k;l)
:
Substitution of (A3) and (A4) into the above denition gives the expression of q in terms of !
and  as in (13).
At the optimum constraints (6) and (7) bind, implying
P1F (k; l) 	
b (!)  b
 


= RN b; (A5)
log

P1
P2
F (k; l) 	b (!)

+ ~	d
 


= log

RMd
P2

: (A6)
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Substituting (A5) into (A6) yields (11).
To derive (12), note that the linear homogeneity of F () together with (9) and (10) imply
P1F (k; l) = qR

Rkk +Wl

: (A.7)
Substituting (A.7) and the equality version of (8) into (A5) yields (12).
We then show that lim!;!0 q = 1 and that q increases with ! and , hence q > 1 for all
!;  > 0 in the neighborhood of !;  = 0. Rewrite q
 
!; 
  % (!){  , where
[% (!)] 1  	b (!)   f (!) 	
b0 (!)
 f 0 (!)
,

{
 

 1  1

 

 "1   b   ~	d0  
 b0
 

 # .
Look at the term % (!). We have [% (!)] 1 < 1 or % (!) > 1 for all ! > 0 since  	b0 (!) = f 0 (!) <
1 and  f (!) + 	b (!) < 1. Also, lim!!0 [% (!)] 1 = 1 since lim!!0
 	b0 (!) = f 0 (!) = 1 and
lim!!0

 f (!) + 	b (!)

= 1. By di¤erentiation,
@% 1
@!
=
 f (!)
[ f 0 (!)]2
h
	b0 (!)  f 00 (!) 	b00 (!)  f 0 (!)
i
:
But
	b0 (!)  f 00 (!) 	b00 (!)  f 0 (!) =  l (!)
h
1  l (!)
i "
1 +
!l (!)
1  l (!) +
!l0 (!)
l (!)
#
:
To sign the above expression we consider two cases. Case 1: lim!!0 l (!) > 0. In this case
lim!!0

	b0 (!)  f 00 (!) 	b00 (!)  f 0 (!) =   lim!!0 l (!) < 0. Case 2: lim!!0 l (!) =
0. But Assumption 1(a) requires l () to be positive, bounded, and continuously di¤eren-
tiable on (0;1). Hence in this case we must have lim!!0 l0 (!) > 0. This means that
for ! positive and su¢ ciently close to 0, we have l (!) > 0 and l0 (!) > 0 and hence
	b0 (!)  f 00 (!) 	b00 (!)  f 0 (!) < 0. In both cases when ! is positive and su¢ ciently close to
0, we have @% 1=@! < 0 and hence @q=@! > 0.
Now look at the term {
 


. Using (14) and (15), we have

{
 

 1
=
A
 

 B  
D
 

 ;
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where
A
 

   b  	d0     b0     b0   ;
B
 

   b   r    b0   [  log (1  )  ] ;
D
 

  1  r  +  Z 
0
1
 (1  )
r () d:
By di¤erentiation,
dA
 


d
=
d
d
(Z 1

 
   r () d"1   r  
1  r  
#
+ 
)
=   E  j    2r     E  j     "r0  +  r  2
1  r  
#
+ r
 


;
where E
 
j   denotes the truncated expectation of , with lim!0E  j   = 1. To sign
this derivative consider two cases. Case 1. lim!0 
r
 


> 0. In this case lim!0 dA
 


=d < 0.
Case 2. lim!0 
r
 


= 0. In this case lim!0 
r0   > 0 as implied by Assumption 1(a), which
requires r () to be positive, bounded, and continuously di¤erentiable on (0;1). Furthermore 
goes to zero at a slower rate than r
 


as lim!0

=r
 


= lim!0

1=r
 


=1. Hence
for  positive and su¢ ciently close to zero we have r
 


dominated by the negative terms and
hence dA
 


=d < 0. In sum dA
 


=d < 0 in the neighborhood of  = 0. Also,
1
  log (1  )  
dB
 


d
=

E
 
j    2r  +E  j    (r0  +  r  2
1  r  
)
:
To sign this derivative again consider two cases. Case 1. lim!0 
r
 


> 0. In this case
lim!0 dB
 


=d > 0 (note that   log (1  )  > 0). Case 2. lim!0 r
 


= 0. In this case
lim!0 
r0   > 0 as implied by Assumption 1(a). This means that for  positive and su¢ ciently
close to zero, both r
 


and r0
 


are positive, hence dB
 


=d > 0. In sum dB
 


=d > 0
in the neighborhood of  = 0. Finally,
dD
 


d
= r
 

 1
1     1

+
Z 
0
1
 (1  )
r () d  0:
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We therefore conclude that d{ 1=d < 0 or d{=d > 0 and hence @q=@ > 0 in the neighborhood
of  = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.
To prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, rst note that a solution to (17) for 
exists and is unique. This is because
h
~	d
 

  log  b  i is increasing in , with lim!0 h~	d    log  b  i
=  1 and lim!1
h
~	d
 

  log  b  i =1. Given , a solution to (18) for ! also exists and
is unique. This is because both q
 
!; 

and 	b (!) are increasing in ! in the neighborhood of
! = 0 and lim!!0 q
 
!; 

	b (!) = 0. Given  and !, it remains to show that a solution to
condition (19) exists and is unique. This is because Fl (K;L) is monotonically decreasing in L,
with limL!0 Fl (K;L) =1 and limL!1 Fl (K;L) = 0 and q
 
!; 

R > 0 is independent of L.
To see how an increase in zb a¤ects L, note that from (17), an increase in zb (with a
corresponding decrease in zd) lowers . As for the change in ! there are two cases. Case 1. !
does not increase. In this case q
 
!; 

obviously decreases since q is increasing in both arguments
in the neighborhood of !;  = 0. Case 2. ! increases. In this case condition (18) implies that q
must decrease since  b
 


increases as a result of the decrease in , 	b (!) increases as a result
of the increase in !, and the right hand side of this condition decreases as a result of the decrease
in zb. Thus in both cases q declines. Condition (19) then implies an increase in L. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1. Flow of funds in the model 
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Figure 2. Banking riskiness shock and the optimal stabilization policy 
 
Note: The horizontal axes represent the banking riskiness shock ε, i.e., deviation of banking riskiness 
σθ from its mean value 0.031. The top panel plots the optimal value of x as a function of ε. The middle 
panel shows the effect of ε on the financial friction indicator q, measured in percentage point 
deviations from its mean value. The bottom panel shows the effect of ε on the equilibrium quantity of 
labor L, measured in percent deviations from its mean value. The dashed lines in the latter two panels 
correspond to the case of no reaction, i.e., x=0 identically, while the solid lines correspond to the case 
where the optimal reaction of x to ε is followed. 
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